

Is Hope the Only Method

The U.S. Army is experiencing an identity crisis. How should the Transformation Army look? Past emphasis has been on leadership competencies. Should future emphasis be on overall organizational effectiveness? If so, the Army will need to take a hard look at management theory. Colonel Christopher R. Paparone suggests ways to begin.

[B]y projecting itself onto its environment, an organization develops a self-referential appreciation of its own identity, which, in turn, permits the organization to act in relation to its environment.

—Peter S. Ring and Andrew H. Van De Ven¹

THE U.S. ARMY is experiencing an identity crisis spurred by a discrepancy between how it views itself and how others view it. The crisis is compounded by the Army's failure to develop a strong theoretical basis for self-analysis. The most recent evidence of this identity crisis is the ongoing, top-down change approach labeled Army Transformation, which was the Army's response to the 1999 problems of deploying Task Force (TF) Hawk in support of operations in Albania. The Army currently has an inadequate theoretical view of itself as an organization. Hence, the Army can only hope to make sense of itself and its environment, especially when it uses only single episodes of performance and a romantic ideal of leadership to judge its organizational effectiveness. Challenging the Army's organizational and managerial assumptions is nearly impossible if the assumptions are not open to professional review.

Maintaining a theoretically sound organizational self-identity is especially vital to large, complex organizations such as the Army. Whether an organization changes itself effectively or poorly depends largely on its self-interpretation and professional willingness to be self-critical, especially within the context of a turbulent environment. Ideally, large organizations can process substantial human, financial, and material resources so as to perform effectively in their environment. Getting the organizational analysis right is critical to the organization's gaining insight into itself and to understanding its organizational effectiveness.²

The Army lacks a cogent, overarching theory of itself, its relation to the environment, and its commitment to reflexivity.³ These shortfalls reveal an important practical issue. Since its abdication of a systemwide theory of organization and management, the Army has invested little intellectual attention to organization and management theory.⁴ The Army has approached organization and management with ephemeral, pop-management prescriptions such as Management-by-Objectives (MBO), Total Quality Management, and now, the "balanced scorecard."⁵ The prescriptions are analogous to a doctor's prescribing medication before diagnosing the problem.

In the last decade, the Army's emphasis has been on inculcating the charismatic leadership competencies and temporary, pop-management prescriptions into its organization. The problem with a leadership-only theory of success is that leadership is not an end to itself. There is no point to developing leaders if the Army does not have a well-developed understanding of its self-evident purpose—to be an effective organization.

Without diagnosing a comprehensive organizational self-image, real transformation will be serendipitous. Contrary to former Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Gordon R. Sullivan, hope becomes the *only* method to bring about change.⁶

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To regain a healthy organizational identity, reflexivity, and appropriate philosophies, the Army must address three critical questions:

1. What is the "nature of the beast?"
2. What can a theoretical framework offer the Army in terms of self-analysis?
3. Which management philosophy provides a continuous self-imaging and reflexive (self-doubting) process yet is compatible with the Army's culture?

The Nature of the Beast

No matter what you have to do with an organization—whether you are going to study it, work in it, consult for it, subvert it, or use it in the interest of another organization—you must have some view of the nature of the beast with which you are dealing.

—Charles B. Perrow⁸

In the Army's premier organizational management publication, *How the Army Runs*, only 3 of the 361 chapter endnotes are from nonmilitary sources.⁹ This small list accounts for less than 1 percent of the referenced sources. The systems-level handbook refers almost exclusively to Army, Department of

Defense (DOD), or other government documents. This closed-system feedback indicates single-loop learning and prevents a higher form of processing feedback, known as Deutero learning (learning how to learn).¹⁰ Perhaps the handbook's publisher, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), should publish a complementary book on "how the Army *should* run," with substantial references to nonofficial literature. Similar criticism can be made with other Army official literature.¹¹

Professional Army journals show an equally disappointing trend. During the 2000 publishing year, only 1 in 10 articles in the two general-topic journals, *Military Review* and *Parameters*, addressed organization and management issues.¹² Most of the articles address leadership theory and practice, leaving about 1 in 100 concerned with other problems of theory of Army organization, management, and practice. Compare this trend with the 1970s and 1980s when the Army contributed to or published the following journals (all of which are now defunct): *Army Administrator: Magazine for Military Managers* (1973-1980); *Organizational Effectiveness Communiqué* (1977-1981); *Defense Management Journal* (1978-1987); *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* (1983-1984).

Today, no such general organization and management journals exist. It is nearly impossible for a large organization to be reflexive if its professional journals do not support management, leadership, and organizational self-criticism.

The Army's self-study of leadership has taken a closed-systems approach.¹³ For example, the Army developed ideal characteristics of strategic leaders based primarily on structured interviews conducted with senior military officers and senior government executives. The Army validated this data by interviewing USAWC students, asking them to describe the most and least effective leaders they knew. The Army used the resulting list of factors to develop a Strategic Leader Development Inventory to help future strategic leaders assess strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the study supported a model of strategic leadership now employed Armywide as doctrine.¹⁴ This methodology is analogous to the blind leading the blind. If the Army is experiencing organizational-effectiveness issues stemming from senior-leader qualities, the Army's leadership system risks perpetuating the same ineffectual qualities now vaunted as the standards for strategic leadership. This is a problem of mirror imaging.

Army CSA General Eric K. Shinseki's professional reading list indicates the same pattern. The



U.S. Air Force controllers coordinate the long-awaited arrival of Black Hawk helicopters at Tirana, Albania.

The crisis of this self-misunderstanding is manifested in unexplainable symptomatic weaknesses, such as episodic recruiting and retention issues, quality of life problems, disillusionment within the ranks, and most influential, operational issues such as those experienced by TF Hawk in 1999, on which the Army has built its current self-evaluation of overall organizational effectiveness. Shinseki tied his vision for transforming the nearly one-million-soldier Army directly to the six-thousand-soldier TF Hawk case study.

list does not include a single book or article on organization or management; all are historical military nonfiction or fiction. The omission of works about organization and management is significant. There are seminal works in these areas that Army professionals cannot ignore.

Unfortunately, these data reflect a shallow organizational and managerial self-identity. The crisis of this self-misunderstanding is manifested in unexplainable symptomatic weaknesses, such as episodic recruiting and retention issues, quality of life problems, disillusionment within the ranks, and most influential, operational issues such as those experienced by TF Hawk in 1999, on which the Army has built its current self-evaluation of overall organizational effectiveness. Shinseki tied his vision for transforming the nearly one-million-soldier Army directly to the six-thousand-soldier TF Hawk case study.¹⁵ Clearly, the Army now lacks a theory for discerning itself, analogous to an individual pursuing a social identity by looking into a mirror. This lack of a theoretical foundation has led the Army to misdiagnose its organi-

zation and management problems because it has not paid proper attention to developing a more complete self-image.

A healthy Army identity would have better facilitated strategic change and would have better directed the quest for stability in a turbulent environment. Like other social activities, studying institutional-level behavior using a more open theory would account for strains (or a reason to change), readiness to change, ideology (justification for existence), and conflict (problems of integration and differentiation). Failure to "know thyself," to understand how one's own subsystems interact within a larger system of organizations within an environment, has led the Army to its current identity crisis.

A Theoretical Framework That Offers Self-Analysis

A theoretical view of Army organizational effectiveness should include multiple perspectives because of the variation in importance and types of Army organizations and technologies. The four dominant



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organization and management models are the human relations model, open systems model, rational goal model, and the internal process model.¹⁶ A fifth possible model is a synthesized model, the competing values framework.¹⁷

The human relations model. The human relations model of organizational effectiveness rates effectiveness as the degree of cooperation in the organization. The only reason to have an organization is "the need of the individual to accomplish purposes to which he is by himself biologically unequal."¹⁸ Therefore, "when the purpose of a system of cooperation [that is, organization] is attained, we say cooperation was effective; if not attained, ineffective."¹⁹ The degree to which Army activities relate well to the external environment while keeping its members satisfied (an internal orientation) determines the organization's survival. The leader's role is to ensure that these processes work well.

The quest for human cooperation can be problematic. Philip Selznick depicts organizations as a collection of contentious interest groups.²⁰ These groups emerge in and around organizations, then develop defensive ideologies. Selznick writes, "The

more precise an organization's goals, and the more specialized and technical its operations, the less opportunity will there be for social forces to affect its development."²¹ He places the matter of conflict-management squarely on the back of executive leadership: "A problem of institutional leadership, as of statesmanship generally, is to see that elites do exist and function while inhibiting their tendency to become sealed off and to be more concerned with their own fate than with that of the enterprise as a whole."²²

From Selznick's view, an Army strategic leader's ideal role would be to increase organized effectiveness through a "committed polity" by defining the institution's mission and role, promoting institutional embodiment of purpose, defending institutional integrity, and making order of internal conflict (maintaining an internal balance of power). This approach is largely incompatible with the Army's current charismatic, top-down leadership model.²³ The Army's emphasis on management goals and charismatic leadership as means to effectiveness tends to ignore organizational politics, a factor of an organization's dynamics outside the Army's espoused values. By

ignoring organizational politics as a dimension of human-relations effectiveness, the Army has institutionally dismissed studying reality and the recurring basis for political favoritism and exploitation.²⁴

The open systems approach. The open systems model of organizational effectiveness, or the basic input, process, and output model, defines organizational effectiveness as “the maximization of return to the organization by . . . economic and technical means [that is, determine efficiency] . . . and political means.”²⁵ Five ways to determine the Army’s organizational effectiveness under this paradigm follow:

1. Preferential ordering of constituencies, which include internal interest groups and dominant coalitions such as basic branches, unit associations, and general officers and their staffs.

2. Survival, which addresses the Army’s successful search for relevance through participation in peace operations, disaster-relief operations, and other nontraditional activities.

3. A culture of innovation that addresses the Army’s change process that should give responsibility and authority for change to the field Army rather than to the departmental or “administrative” Army.

4. Throughput, which measures how well the Army satisfies the immediate demands of Congress, the media, the public, and other groups outside the Army.

5. Contributing to the “suprasystem,” which legitimizes an organization through, in the Army’s case, its contribution to a higher social structure. Besides winning wars, contributions might include Corps of Engineers construction projects and better educated citizens (courtesy of the GI Bill) who return to private life with inculcated Army values.²⁶

The rational goals model. The rational goals view of organizational effectiveness reflects early Taylorist thinking about the behavior of organizations.²⁷ A preferential ordering of goals is similar to the outcomes of a rational decisionmaking process of operations-research methods.

Amitai Etzioni considers organizational effectiveness another name for goal achievement. He says, “Goals . . . constitute a source of legitimacy which justifies the activities of an organization and, indeed, its very existence.”²⁸ Ineffectiveness results from straying from or abandoning organizational goals.

Graham T. Allison, in his 1969 seminal evaluation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, explained what he called the rational actor model.²⁹ The rational process of decisionmaking involves recognizing problems, based

on relevant values and objectives; developing alternatives; estimating the consequences of alternatives; calculating the net value of consequences; and choosing the alternative that maximizes value. This way of determining effectiveness not only appeals to the Army’s culture, it approaches the essence of

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the institution’s ideology. The Army War College uses the ends, ways, and means approach to explain the strategy process, and it uses case studies to illustrate their importance in rational analysis of effectiveness.³⁰ Since 1980, the Army has based officer performance ratings on a rational MBO scheme. The Army has thoroughly institutionalized a rational military decisionmaking process, a complex 38-step procedure.³¹ The goals approach to organizational effectiveness is inherent to the Army institution, yet might be at the root of the Army’s identity problems.

The internal process model. Internal coordination is the primary value associated with this model of organizational effectiveness. Standardization, measurement, objectivity, predictability, and control are keys to governing a bureaucratized organization effectively. Rules and procedures guide employees as they accomplish tasks along functional lines and integrate their work with other functions based on rules and procedures. Clearly, this model exemplifies the hierarchical nature of military structures, especially within the institutional or departmental Army and often within the peacetime activities of the field Army. The nature of organizational effectiveness under the rubric of this model should be familiar, especially to members of the TDA Army.³² This over-emphasis on internal processes is another root of the Army’s identity crisis.

The competing values framework. Social scientists Robert E. Quinn and John Rohrbaugh synthesized many aspects of the above approaches into a competing values framework (CVF) to define organizational effectiveness.³³ CVF is a

multidimensional framework that integrates several competing schools of thought on management theory, including all of the previous models, and accounts for paradoxical factors of organizational effectiveness. The framework recognizes the paradoxical and dynamic nature of organizations and their management. CVF accounts for the ways mentioned in the

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previous four approaches and adds the “pull and tug” or inherent competition of values associated with each model in an organization. All of the models apply to some degree in all organizations.

The four competing management models create archetypes of means and ends when plotted on two axes. The north-south axis portrays the flexibility versus control paradox; the second depicts the people (internal focus on members and technologies) versus organization (external focus on the organization within an environment) paradox. The theoretical complexity of CVF is quite valuable to students of organization and management theories because it accounts for multiple time orientations and paradoxes in organizations where other models are too simple to do so.³⁴ CVF retains the possibility of making discriminations among competing interpretations because it is a meta-paradigm theory.³⁵

CVF views organizational effectiveness as a judgment call (or a matter of diagnosis) based on the organization's performance in all four quadrants.³⁶ Since CVF's inception, many studies have followed, extending application to a host of organization and management areas, including executive leadership, management mastery, group decisionmaking, ethics, organizational culture, transformation, policy reform, business communications, management information systems, human resource development, and management training and development.³⁷

The CVF has achieved a general framework status in organizational and management theory and practice. However, the Army has not recognized CVF's potential contribution to organizational effectiveness.

Appropriate Management Philosophy in Self-Imaging

Empirical research supports CVF's practicality because it seems to account for organizational effectiveness and differences in organizational culture and leadership styles. For example, building on the framework, researchers developed an integrative model of executive leadership roles, then tested the model empirically.³⁸ Leaders with high behavioral complexity (the ability to deal in competing value situations) appear to produce the best performance. In other words, those who master diverse and seemingly conflicting leadership roles deliver higher performance than those who possess lopsided approaches. When applied to leaders, the resulting integrative model posits four competing demands that all top managers and executive leaders face. (Note how these match up with the four quadrants of competing values in figure 1.)

1. Commitment—developing and motivating people and maintaining a distinctive identity and value system (associated with the human relations model).

2. Innovation—positioning the organization in terms of strategic direction and missions (associated with the open systems model).

3. Performance—executing plans and achieving results in competition with others (associated with the rational goal model).

4. Efficiency—managing ongoing operations and critically evaluating alternative projects and programs (associated with the internal process model).³⁹

Leader roles associated with competing demands in the model correspond to the following:

- The motivator (stirs meaning, excitement, cause worth fighting for, lots of symbolism, story-telling).
- The vision-setter (senses, provides a compelling mission and sense of identity).




Figure 1. Competing value sets and effectiveness models.

□ The taskmaster (is concerned with performance and results, serving stakeholders, uses hands-on leadership style).

□ The analyzer (sets contexts and shapes decisions that operating systems make).⁴⁰

The Army presently displays symptoms of a closed system fraught with unrecognized competing values, being somewhat obsessed with the rational goals and internal process models of effectiveness. By accepting this conclusion, several propositions concerning Army self-imaging and adoption of a flexible management philosophy come to mind.

Proposition 1. *The Army should assess its organization and management identity using multiple models of organization and management theory.*

The Army must revise and maintain its description of its systems of command, leadership, and management and update it after a thorough review of the last 10 years of study in organization and management theory.

Proposition 2. *The Army should develop multiple ways of analysis and synthesis toward understanding its own organizational effectiveness among competing values.*

This proposition does not suggest abandoning the traditional goals-based model, the Weberian-based charismatic leadership model, or the “lessons learned from the last operation” model. Rather, the Army should have multiple and continuous ways to examine itself in its many domains in peace and war. Using various perspectives allows the investigator to map technical core activities, managerial-level actions, and strategies at the institutional level, not unlike topographers mapping terrain. This mapping process is beneficial to all levels and should not be limited to the macro-perspective of the Army’s for-

mal change agents—the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

As an example of this proposition’s power, figures 2 and 3 demonstrate snapshots of the Army operating in dual domains. The implications of domain

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duality are clear. The dissonance of any changes the Army pursues in the departmental domain is largely because of a failure to recognize what domain leadership is addressing (or acting on). Part of the failure results from the Army not taking a systemwide view of itself as it tries to adapt to (at least) two domains with competing values. The CVF provides a continuous process for evaluating Army effectiveness in multiple domains. Transformation in two domains becomes a matter of changing the emphasis in four areas.

Proposition 3. *The Army should consider adopting the competing values framework as a systemwide organization and management paradigm.*

This proposition does not suggest that the Army ignore the supporting four approaches to organization effectiveness or pay attention only to the theory, research, and practice of the competing values framework. On the contrary, to understand fully this macro-theory, the Army, as a profession, must




Figure 2. The Army as a department.




Figure 3. The fielded Army.

understand the complex theoretical underpinnings of all the supporting organizational effectiveness approaches. Understanding all four approaches requires the Army to commit to accepting a comprehensive organizational effectiveness philosophy that

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transcends the Army's emphasis on heroic leadership, rational goal-seeking, and internal process improvement.

A systematic evaluation of competing values of organizational effectiveness will yield a pattern of Army identity as well as a useful diagnosis of suborganizations operating in different domains of the environment. This approach will allow a deeper, more compelling emergence of a transformation strategy that considers more than a single, post-operation measure of organizational effectiveness. The leadership challenge is not to emphasize one model over another but to address the appropriate pattern of emphasis on all four approaches that best meets the internal, external, flexibility, and control requirements in the particular context at hand. In fact, a highly adaptive organization can alter these patterns without a hierarchical form of leadership and management. In an adaptive organization, leadership becomes the "management of meaning," creating a shared meaning of what that pattern should be.⁴¹

Proposition 4. *The Army must ensure its education system is serving a healthy organizational reflexivity and managerial identity.*

An example of competing values that the Army educational system might address is when field Army's technicians and managers conduct boundary-spanning activities that break the "closed sys-

tem" shields that protect the departmental domain. Such activities will engender interaction and change in a departmental Army or institutional Army. The Army's educational processes must deal with this kind of value conflict more systematically.

The Army must promote the importance of professional organizational reflexivity and create more opportunities for debate between soldiers and civilians. The Army also should bring back at least one professional journal concerned with these debates. Army publications dealing with leadership, management, and organization should document sources (the mark of a profession) that are transdisciplinary and outside DOD's existing body of literature.

Proposition 5. *Organization and management theory should be integrated into a multilens (topographic) approach to strategic thinking rather than the Army's traditional heroic leadership, goals (ends, ways, and means), and internal process improvement approaches.*

For example, the USAWC's compartmentalization of organization and management, national military strategy, and campaigning in its curriculum is unnecessary and counterproductive. The Army can formulate strategy and continuously assess itself in a more integrative manner.⁴² Greater environmental appreciation, creativity, and a richer national strategy results from blending organization, management, and political-military areas of study.

Proposition 6. *Establishing an organization and management identity makes a more comprehensive and continuous organizational transformation process possible.*

The Army has designed a campaign for an Army Transformation that promotes an underdeveloped organization and management self-image.⁴³ Changing the Army's structure while the Army is trapped in a closed system of organizational effectiveness theory leads to structural inertia.⁴⁴ Structural inertia occurs when "in a world of high uncertainty, adaptive efforts . . . turn out to be essentially random with respect to future value."⁴⁵ The outcome might be an Army structural mismatch, where hope was the only method. **MR**

NOTES

1. Peter S. Ring and Andrew H. Van De Ven, "Developmental Process of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships," *Academy of Management Journal* 19 (1994): 100. Ring and Van De Ven maintain that the sense of identity in relation to others and construction of a common external factual order regarding social relations derive from the need for "sense making."

2. See two seminal works: James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) and Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).

3. A reflexive organization continuously examines its own roots of argument and considers other assumptions, purposefully creating dissonance to create opportunities for transcendence or transformation. For more on this subject, see Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips, and Stewart Clegg, "Reflexivity in Organization and Management Theory: A

Study of the Production of the Research Subject," *Human Relations* 54, no. 5 (2001): 531-60. These researchers define reflexivity as "an awareness of the situatedness of scientific knowledge and an understanding of the researcher and research community from which knowledge has appeared" (554). See also Ray Holland, "Reflexivity," *Human Relations* 52, no. 4 (1999): 463-84. Holland defines "transdisciplinary reflexivity" as going beyond the traditional view of unidisciplinary reflexivity and into four levels of reflexive analysis (474). To find meaning, the organization must be willing to look outside itself "transorganizationally" to question itself and its organization-centric paradigms.

4. Christopher R. Paparone, "Piercing the Corporate Veil: OE and Army Transformation," *Military Review* (March-April 2001): 78-82.

5. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1996).

6. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York: Broadway Books, 1997).
7. Refers to Max Weber's early 19th-century notions of charismatic leadership—leadership that serves to lead adaptive action by rational determination of ends and means. As adaptation becomes more institutionalized, the leader transfers power to the "expert bureaucrat." Weber's notions epitomize the current Army orientation on "strategic leadership" and its bureaucratic (incremental) approach to transformation; U.S. Department of the Army (DA) Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be, Know and Do* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], June 1999).
8. Charles B. Perrow, *Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970), 1.
9. DA, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Book* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College [USAWC], 1999). Since this research was conducted, a newer version of *How the Army Runs* was published in 2001. Even the last remnants of nonmilitary references appear to have been removed since the original version.
10. S.A. Mohrman and T.G. Cummings, *Self-Designing Organizations: Learning How to Create High Performance* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989). According to Mohrman and Cummings, single-loop learning is the "lowest level of action learning" (125). In short, this involves improving business as usual without changing the organization's values. Double-loop learning involves "changing the existing organizational values," creating a deeper change process (126). Deutero learning, important in designing high-performing organizations, involves making single- and double-loop learning part of a nonstop learning-to-learn change process (129-30). Learning and transformation is not episodic, but a continuous progression that involves simultaneous action at all levels.
11. See, for example, Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001); DA Pamphlet 10-1, *Organization of the United States Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1994); and FM 22-100.
12. A review of the topic areas during a recent 12-month period (*Military Review* and *Parameters* from January 2000 to December 2000) reveals that of 106 and 37 articles, respectively, 10 (9 percent) and 5 (14 percent) pertain to general organization and management topics. The total was 15 of 143 articles (roughly 10 percent).
13. Thomas Owen Jacobs, *A Guide to the Leader Development Inventory* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 1998). Much of this work is based on the theories of social scientist Elliot Jacques, who indicated an absolute need for hierarchy in organizations. See also Jacques, "The Development of Intellectual Capability: A Discussion of Stratified Systems Theory," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences* 22, no. 4 (date unknown): 361-83.
14. FM 22-100.
15. General Eric K. Shinseki took the Army chief of staff position directly after his previous dual positions as commander of U.S. Army Europe and as the NATO commander-on-the-ground in Bosnia. He witnessed the difficulties of deploying Army forces into an Albanian area of operations, which had the poorest seaport, airport, and road and bridge infrastructures in Europe. The Army Transformation process is designed to lighten up the Army's armor and mechanized units to make them more deployable the next time the Army goes to a place like Albania. The Army did not develop a transformation project from a more comprehensive and continuous approach to organizational effectiveness.
16. For a discussion of the human relations model, see Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); for the open systems model, see Katz and Kahn; for the rational goal model, see Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964); for the internal process model, see Max Weber, *Sociological Writings*, ed. and trans. Wolf Heydebrand (New York: Continuum, 1999), which is a translated compilation of Weber's original works written during the early 20th century.
17. Robert E. Quinn and John Rohrbaugh, "A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria: Towards a Competing Values Approach to Organizational Analysis," *Management Science* 29, no. 3 (1983): 363-77.
18. Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1968; originally published in 1938), vii.
19. *Ibid.*, 43.
20. Phillip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, January 1984).
21. *Ibid.*, 16.
22. *Ibid.*, 14.
23. FM 22-100 stresses the hierarchical nature of Army leadership (levels of leadership). For example, "strategic leaders include military and DA civilian leaders at major command through [DOD] levels" (1-12). Organizational effectiveness appears to be limited to the result of leaders developing a force that can fight and win wars, clearly an unpredictable, episodic measure of effectiveness. Yet, this indeed seems to be the dominant, if not single, measure when examining the history of major Army reform (post-1965 Civil War; post-1898 Spanish-American War; post-1918 and World War I; post-1945 World War II; post-1975 Vietnam; post-1991 Cold War; and 1998-Kosovo reforms). By limiting this definition of organizational effectiveness, the Army cannot continuously monitor its effectiveness in a holistic systems manner.
24. The Task Force (TF) Hawk case study reveals the importance of this effect on the "logics of action" to examine at least one significant decision made seemingly under micropolitical vice military-rational criteria. A U.S. corps in Germany was supposed to send a brigade combat team (BCT) to Kosovo once Serbia capitulated, but the decision process to select which BCT was apparently heavily laden with organizational politics. Although the BCT in Albania (part of TF Hawk) was capable of displacing to Macedonia and Kosovo more quickly than any Germany-based BCT, only its company-size elements were redeployed through Macedonia, so that the BCT colors from another "politically favored" Army division would be first into the Kosovo area of operations. Unless the Army acknowledges that such political decisionmaking occurs in the ranks, it cannot develop an honest understanding of itself.
25. Katz and Kahn, 255.
26. *Ibid.*, 239-47.
27. This refers to Frederick Taylor's circa 1910 scientific management concepts.
28. Etzioni, 5.
29. Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Political Science Review* LXIII, no. 3 (1969): 689-718.
30. A.F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* (January-February 1997): 183-86. The arguable reification of this approach at the Army War College has constrained other ways of thinking about strategy. For example, the exercise of combining the dynamic environmental sectors and dimensions (proposed by Katz and Kahn) and mentioned under Proposition 5, might provide an alternative perspective.
31. Paparone, "U.S. Army Decision-Making: Past, Present and Future," *Military Review* (July-August 2001): 45-54.
32. Tables of Distribution and Allowances.
33. Quinn and Rohrbaugh, "A Spatial Model."
34. Joseph Ofori-Dankwa and Scott D. Julian, "Complexifying Organizational Theory: Illustrations Using Time Research," *Academy of Management Review* 26, no. 3 (date unknown): 415-30. CVF is a third-order complexity theory on a scale of one to four.
35. Marianne W. Lewis and Andrew J. Grimes, "Metatriangulation: Building Theory from Multiple Paradigms," *The Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 4 (1999): 672-90.
36. Quinn and Rohrbaugh, "A Competing Values Approach to Organizational Effectiveness," *Public Productivity Review* (June 1981): 122-40.
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38. Hart and Quinn, 543-74.
39. The chart in figure 1 is from Quinn and Rohrbaugh, "A Spatial Model," 136; Hart and Quinn, 551.
40. *Ibid.*, 543.
41. There is a growing, rich literature on this symbolic role of leadership. See Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan, "Leadership: The Management of Meaning," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 18, no. 3 (1982): 257-73; Louis R. Pondy, "Leadership is a Language Game," in Morgan W. McCall and Michael M. Lombardo, *Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1978), 87-99; Patricia Bradshaw, "Reframing Board-Staff Relations: Exploring the Governance Function Using a Storytelling Metaphor," *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 12, no. 4 (2002): 471-84; and perhaps the best empirical study in this vein of research, James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 30 (1985): 78-102.
42. What if shifts in foreign policy are significant based on elections of the President and dominant-party changes in Congress? How do you design a military organization that has enough slack (flexibility and capacity) to deal with these policy shifts? For example, if the administration of President George W. Bush were to shift to a kind of Caspar Weinberger-Colin Powell doctrine/homeland defense policy, does this make Army Transformation "overcome by events"? I argue that the Army tends to be episodic in organization redesign and defining effectiveness rather than have continuous change mechanisms in place. Research demonstrates that the more uncertain the environment, the more diffuse innovation and change mechanisms need to be in the organization. The nature of the organization also becomes more political. In Henry Mintzberg, James A. Waters, Andrew M. Pettigrew, and Richard Butler, "Studying Deciding: An Exchange of Views between Mintzberg, Waters, Pettigrew, and Butler," *Organizational Studies* 11, no. 1 (publisher unknown, 1990), 1-16, Butler concludes that the complexity "concerning ends/means relations will tend to increase the diffuseness of decisionmaking as more specialists and interest units get involved as an organization attempts to resolve uncertainty" (13).
43. DA, *The Army Vision*, on-line at <www.army.mil/armyvsn/armyvsn.htm>, 12 March 2001.
44. For a complete explanation, see M.T. Hannon and J. Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," *American Sociological Review* 49 (1984): 149-64.
- 45.1 *ibid.*, 151.

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